On the morning of the 13th of January 1976 General Murtala Ramat Muhammed was assassinated when a hit squad submachine gunned his Mercedes Benz Limousine as it slowed down at the junction of Bank Rd and Ikoyi Rd. Other hit teams simultaneously went after other key functionaries of the regime’s troika, namely the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. T. Y. Danjuma. The Military Governors of Kwara and Oyo States, Colonels Ibrahim Taiwo and David Jemibewon, respectively, were also targeted.
Taiwo, who had been the national coordinator of the July 1975 coup that brought Mohammed to power, was abducted and killed by a team led by Major K. K. Gagara. Jemibewon, whose name had been added to the list of targets by Lt. Col T. K. Adamu, merely because Adamu “did not like his face”, escaped.
General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) has written that he was late in leaving home that day on account of a visit by Brigadier Olu Bajowa to get a name for his new baby. When it became apparent that there was trouble, Obasanjo executed an escape and evasion manoeuvre, spent most of the day at the house of a civilian friend in Ikoyi monitoring the situation by telephone, but later emerged to become the Head of State. His would be assassins mistook then Colonel Dumuje for him along Awolowo road in Lagos, seriously wounding that officer.
That morning, General Danjuma followed his usual route at the usual time, 7:30 a.m., which route consisted of leaving his home by car for the Chief of Naval Staff’s Jetty at Queen’s Drive, where he would board a launch which would take him to the Ministry of Defence Jetty at the Marina. From there he would usually walk across the road into his office in Army Headquarters.
On this morning he found Col. Bali and the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Adelanwa, awaiting him at Queens Drive. They rode together to the Marina without incident and reached their offices without any sign of unusual movements.
He was busy reading his newspapers in the office at a few minutes past eight when Col. Bali came in and asked him if he had heard what happened. When he said he had not, Col. Bali then told him that there had been a voice over the radio announcing that there had been a coup. The first thing that General Danjuma asked for was a radio, since he did not usually keep one in his office. A radio was brought in and a number of other officers came in to the office to listen. As soon as he heard the announcement he sent for then Col. Ibrahim Babangida. Ibrahim Babangida and Domkat Bali were two particularly efficient officers who had served with General Danjuma during the war.
General Danjuma told Col. Babangida who was commanding the Recce Squadron to get to Ikeja where his armoured cars were parked and secure his unit as swiftly as he could. As he was about to leave, General Danjuma further suggested to him that he should go on a motorcycle, since the roads were said to be clogged with traffic. This instruction had another tactical advantage in that any of the coup participants looking out for loyal soldiers would hardly have expected to find them on the pillion seats of motorcycles.
After Babangida left, General Danjuma received a phone call from Col. Muhammadu Buhari, the Governor of Bornu State. Col. Buhari was trying to call the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, General Obasanjo, but he had been put on to the wrong office. General Danjuma asked him if he had heard what had happened and he replied that he had not. General Danjuma briefed him on what he had heard on the radio and also told him that he had rung Dodan Barracks and discovered that General Muhammed had not reached his office, even though he had ascertained from General Muhammed’s wife that he had left home. Col. Buhari’s only comment was “I hope they haven’t killed him”. General Danjuma instructed him to contact the Brigade Commander in his area immediately and secure loyalty there and make sure that no one left the barracks in the town.
The next phone call that came into his office was from General Bisalla. He asked General Danjuma if he had heard what had happened. General Danjuma said that he had heard, but that all would soon be under control. General Bisalla simply hung up the phone. It was later learnt that on replacing the phone he turned to a top civil servant who was standing next to him and commented, “So this is how people ruin one’s career”. His office was just above General Danjuma’s in the Ministry of Defence Building.
Immediately after this call, General Danjuma, on the advice of Colonel Bali, moved his headquarters to Bonny Camp.
Colonel Babangida got to Ikeja Cantonment and secured his armoured vehicles. Supported by these vehicles he proceeded to Radio Nigeria, where he had a conversation with his close friend Dimka. Dimka’s initial reaction to Babangida’s arrival was to ask him if he came to play “Chukwuma and Nwawo” with him; drawing a historical parallel with the negotiations between Colonel Conrad Nwawo (on behalf of Ironsi) and Major Patrick Nzeogwu in Kaduna in January 1966. However, Dimka got concerned with the presence of armored vehicles in the background and asked them to be withdrawn.
But it turns out that Babangida’s orders had not been to negotiate a surrender or other outcome, but to stop the broadcast – by any means necessary – including destruction by shelling. When he made contact with Bonny Camp to report his activities at the radio station, this order was reiterated to him by General Danjuma, incredulous that a conversation with Dimka had even occurred and that the radio station was still playing Dimka’s broadcast. A brief but fierce fire fight (reportedly led by Major Chris Ugokwe) subsequently dislodged the coup plotters from the station.
When shooting started Dimka simply walked away, past all the soldiers surrounding the building as well as driving through numerous checkpoints on his way, first to Jos and then eventually to Abakaliki where he was captured by Police in the company of a woman of easy virtue.
Source: Greg Nwoko, Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow