From Europe to Asia and the Middle East, the international news networks have painted torrid scenes for days, about the aftermath of the withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan. The issue for Nigeria is how to interpret what has happened, in view of our local war on terrorism, banditry and the herdsmen menace. The insurgents are not going anywhere in a hurry. A military-commercial complex, echoing President Dwight Eisenhower’s foreboding about an American military-industrial complex, is now entrenched and aligned in an uneasy relationship with the theocratic movement, which championed the institutionalisation of Sharia law across states in swathes of the north. The alliance cannot be wished away and those who profit from misery are not going to close shop for our amusement or convenience.
Right now, there is deep unease about the structure of Nigeria’s debt and the ability to repay it. The difficulties of reconciling debt repayment with ever increasing borrowings has to be faced. To avoid a debt overhang, the country must increase production to get the surplus revenue needed for debt repayment. Increasing production in the face of the dislocation wrought by insurgency, is going to be herculean. In addition, compared to a lot of African countries (Ghana, South Africa, Rwanda), the perception of Nigeria, even without the war on terrorism, is not very favourable. The issue of what is to be done never goes away. The time is ripe to think the unthinkable. In his lamentation, “The Ballad of Reading Goal”, the poet Oscar Wilde echoed Lord Alfred Douglas’ “Two Loves” by describing homosexuality as “the love that dares not mention its name”. The country must dare at this propitious time to ponder about those issues whose name cannot be mentioned.
Various expressions of the indigenous thinking of the Afghans stalled and sent the British, Russians and Americans packing in succession; these were clearly rooted in the hearts, minds and norms of the people. After the entrenchment of sharia in the North, we must ponder about the level of acceptance of the insurgents within northern localities. Nothing is now unthinkable, including a national compromise based on one country, two or even three systems. As Marx put it most succinctly in his 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte from 1852: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” We must find solutions under the present daunting conditions, and we have an increasingly limited time to do so.
Nigeria is facing overlapping security crises, from Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen, to kidnapping cartels and banditry of all shapes. These deadly waves of insecurity have given rise to ethnic and regional agitations that are well founded, given the thin political glue binding the country together. Unfortunately, the success of the Taliban may embolden the extremists and conflict entrepreneurs determined to make Nigeria its next playground. For a country in desperate need of a coherent strategy for its war on Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen and bandits, there are dreadful lessons in military tactics and strategy to be learnt from America’s failure in Afghanistan.
First, Nigeria has an elite problem that it has to confront. Political leaders who do not desire the fate of the Afghan president should join hands and face the evil that exists among them. I have written before that, “In Nigeria, there exists a Military Commercial Complex with a game plan to induce war. For a deformed post-colonial state or in the case of Nigeria’s “semi-democracy”, in the churlish observation of The Economist, the incursion of a military-commercial complex can be catastrophic. The war against terror in the Northeast has become a business. There is no framework or institutional processes for accountability and those involved are in no hurry to end a profitable business venture.” Where in the world are terrorists, who have engaged in mass slaughter, mollycoddled, given free pass and rehabilitated, while their victims are ignored, made to languish at camps and rely on foreign aid workers for food and clothing?
Second, the Nigerian military cannot win any war using the old order of battle or the expensive, tech-rich war of the West, who have the money and know-how to maintain their fleet of Tucanos, Chinooks and C17s. Our military has to be redesigned to be more agile. The Taliban won with Toyota Hilux vans and hand propelled arms. We need to maintain healthy, kitted, well paid and motivated troops, with basic supplies. And also be committed to good maintenance, superior logistical support and swift air cover.
Third, many times, Nigeria has announced the technical defeat of Boko Haram. Many times, Shekau has been declared dead, only for him to “resurrect”. Battlefield victories alone do not bring lasting peace. For peace to last, it must have the vital ingredients of political settlement and enduring outcomes. War philosophers, dating back to St. Augustine, agreed that war is a failure of politics. That is the lesson America failed to learn in Vietnam and now in Afghanistan. Battlefield victories alone do not win wars. The critical issues involved in Nigeria’s foundational fissures must be addressed. There has to be an understanding and appreciation of the underlying issues, and political solutions found.
Afghanistan has humbled America, with the images we are seeing. It has proven to the world again that it is the “graveyard of empires”. By agreeing to withdraw, America has accepted that other than withdrawal, nothing could have prevented the outcome playing out before us, besides the unacceptable option of a bloody and expensive permanent occupation. With its jagged mountainous terrain, fortress homes, strong tribal identities, and baked in the guerrilla lifestyle that has become part of its culture, Afghanistan can weigh down any foreign power.
For Nigeria and Nigerians wondering how to solve our own insecurity challenges, there are tough choices ahead. With the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill, the phasing out of subsidies is inevitable (a good thing, I’d say). In the short term, we will see the erosion of purchasing power, leading to heightened anxiety, which may trigger waves of discontent. Will insurgents capitalise on mass poverty and discontent to win hearts and minds by providing public goods that the government fails to provide, especially to the Northern poor?
To dig ourselves out of this hole, the Presidency and our military must examine the critical issues, the root causes and think more deeply, honestly and be more sincere in their approach to the issues involving the herdsmen, kidnapping and insurgency. For example, what are the roles and positions of clerics and traditional institutions who control hearts and minds in the North, on the issues? What is the strategic imperative in the short, medium and long terms? For how long can we sustain the expenditure on the war? Can our finances sustain an endless war?
When President John F. Kennedy brought in Robert McNamara, the CEO of Ford Motors, as Defence Secretary, the mandate was to implement the Performance Planning Budget System in order to streamline the defence budget and make it more cost effective. Are we planning any such thing? Does the present Defence Minister have the managerial sagacity of McNamara who came in with a fantastic track record? Sadly, even McNamara was stomped in Vietnam. In the words of Fela “Question jam answer”.
Source: Bamidele Ademola-Olateju, PT