On Saturday, February 25, 2023, Nigeria conducted an election for the position of President, which was widely regarded as the most fiercely contested in the country since 1999. On March 01, 2023, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared Bola Ahmed Tinubu, candidate of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), as the winner and President-elect. On May 29, the Chief Justice of Nigeria swore him in as the Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces and 16th president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
While the reaction of the international community was mixed, the two major opposition parties, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Labour Party (LP), took their dissatisfaction to the Presidential Election Petitions Tribunal in Abuja in petitions challenging the announced outcome of the presidential election.
Their core argument revolves around the President’s alleged failure to secure “not less than 25 per cent of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of the States of the Federation, AND the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja,” as mandated by the constitution (capitals added). They contend that this constitutional requirement was not met in the elections.
The challenge to the February 25, 2023 presidential election results has revived a well-known constitutional dilemma around the intended meaning of the phrase “and FCT” in the aforementioned constitutional clause as distinct from “including FCT” or “plus FCT.” While there may be disagreement on the precise interpretation, it seems generally agreed that the intention was not to exclude the FCT from the constitutional requirement.
If indeed the framers of the constitution intended “and FCT” to mean “plus FCT” or “FCT specifically,” the opposition would be justified in challenging INEC’s declaration of an APC victory. If the interpretation leans towards “including FCT,” then INEC’s result would fulfill the specific constitutional requirement, especially considering that the 1999 Constitution also acknowledges that the FCT can be treated as a state.
If the former, then this raises the fundamental question of why the framers of the 1999 Constitution would grant such a special right or privileged status to citizens of Abuja and the FCT that voters in other administrative units in the country do not enjoy.
To unravel the “and FCT” conundrum, it is important to examine what the founding fathers of the 1999 Constitution, all military personnel, had in mind when they decided earlier, in 1976, to build a new capital city on virgin land and set it up as a special federal capital territory. This article analyzes the historical context and the public policy considerations that drove the establishment of Abuja as a FCT, in order to inform the ongoing national debate and decision-making concerning the 2023 presidential election petition process.
The Founding Fathers of the FCT/Abuja
Among the various reasons identified for the decision to construct Abuja, two factors stand out prominently. Firstly, there was the notion of “national pride.” As Africa’s most populous country and one of the wealthiest due to its abundant natural resources (further bolstered by the oil boom and petrodollars of the 1970s), Nigeria was seen by both its citizens and the international community as the “black giant” of Africa and potentially a global leader.
The military, as the founding fathers of Abuja in the mid-1970s, believed that Nigeria was destined for greatness. They aspired to build an ultramodern city that would rival Western capitals and serve as a source of national pride and symbol of modernity for black people worldwide. A new capital city in Abuja deliberately located inland and distinct from the congested and traffic-heavy urban landscape of Lagos, the military believed, would establish a modern and prestigious metropolis, simultaneously banishing the conspicuous remnants of British colonial influence in Nigeria. This reinforced the notion of a new, independent Nigeria that had firmly arrived as a legitimate member of the “Newer World.”
The second significant motivation behind the military’s choice of Abuja was the concept of an administrative framework known as the FCT. Beyond the evident fact that the FCT does not possess the typical characteristics of a Nigerian state, lacking an elected Governor but instead having an appointed Minister of the FCT, there is a less known yet crucial aspect of “national unity and ethnic neutrality”.
As I wrote years ago, “It is common knowledge that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country …and that the country has been riffed by ethnic rivalry from its inception. Lagos, obviously, is a Yoruba land and with such a lop-sided ethnic mix (Yoruba, 72.2% Igbo,15.4% Edo, 3.17% and Hausa, 2.05% in 1963), it was felt that the city, as capital, is inimical to the spirit of national unity, as it could never be a place where all Nigerians could lay claim to every available right, privilege and resource on an equal footing. This could only be achieved in a sort of no-man’s land where no one ethnic group predominated.”
The just concluded May 2023 gubernatorial elections in Lagos confirmed this fundamental truth about the Nigerian polity. In the weeks and months leading up to that election, the prevailing discourse revolved around the question of who are the “real owners” or “indigenes” of Lagos and which individuals or groups possessed a more legitimate right to influence and shape the city-state’s future political trajectory.
The strategic location of Abuja—an attempt to make it equi-polity-distant for all
Thus, the founding fathers of Abuja in the 1970s and 1980s embarked on a social re-engineering endeavour with the goal of achieving three objectives related to national unity and cohesion. Firstly, they aimed to strategically locate Abuja at the geographical heartland of the country. By doing so, they hoped that both government and development would be brought closer to the governed., . This approach aimed to ensure that citizens from all parts of the country had relatively equal access to the capital city in terms of physical distance.
Additionally, it is worth noting that one of the underlying motivations for the establishment of Abuja was a desire to address the concerns of the northern elite for conducting the nation’s affairs from a capital that was not located so far away in the perceived hostile southern region.
The question of who owns Abuja and making it a place for all, on equal footing?
Secondly, another key objective pursued by the military proponents of Abuja was to establish a territory that would provide equal rights and opportunities to all Nigerians, devoid of any specific regional or ethnic affiliations. To achieve this strategic objective, the military regime made a series of ‘deliberate and courageous decisions’ regarding the FCT.
They carefully selected a central area in Nigeria that had relatively low population density and limited development. This selection was crucial in creating a neutral ground where every Nigerian would be treated equally and have the same rights. In response to this, the military government claimed full ownership of the entire FCT area, granting the federal government complete control over the land. Unlike in any of the other 36 states of Nigeria, the federal government possesses 100 per cent monopoly control over the land in the FCT.
Thirdly, and significantly, the military decided to compensate and physically relocate all indigenous populations from within the FCT. Approximately 600 villages predominantly inhabited by farmers and potters belonging to the Gbagyi or Gwari ethnic groups, had to be swiftly resettled between 1976 and 1991. Where relocation of the indigenes proved costly, the military government simply decided to excise those parts from the FCT, as can be observed by examining the map of the FCT (Figure 2), where one can notice a distinct “V” shape at the top. This cutout represents the removal of the present-day Suleja town and its sizable indigenous population from the FCT.
Situating FCT/Abuja within the political and democratic framework of the new Nigeria
During the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983), significant construction work began in Abuja. However, the bold and visionary decisions to build Abuja, along with meticulous planning and the allocation of substantial resources for its groundbreaking and full-scale implementation, were made under Generals Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo (1975-1979). It can be argued that Abuja represents one of the most remarkable and ambitious endeavours in political and social re-engineering for nation-building undertaken by the Nigerian military. Subsequent military rulers – Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), Sani Abacha (1993-1998), Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999), and Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) – demonstrated increased commitment in terms of political support and financial resources allocated to the project.
Considering the foregoing historical context of the capital relocation, it is reasonable to assume that the military, while formulating the Nigerian Constitution of 1999, deemed it appropriate to uphold the same principles and institutionalize in the political fabric of the country the “broad official aims for the new capital,” including among others:
“To provide for a physical symbol of national unity, and of Nigeria as a symbol of Pan Africa unity; and To provide a physical expression of the ideal constitutional democratic government.”
They had envisioned FCT/Abuja as a place where ethnic considerations would not dictate political power and where the genuine essence of Nigerian polity could emerge unhindered.
Conclusion – FCT/Abuja as electorate- barometer of the nation’s true pulse and spirit
It is hoped that this article has provided some insight into history on the FCT/Abuja that many Nigerians may not know, along with how this relates to the constitutional issue about the 25% threshold of voters in the FCT/Abuja. To understand this debate, one must decode the reasons behind its establishment and the great lengths to which successive Nigerian military rulers (1975-2007) went to create a special identity for the territory and enshrine it in the 1999 Constitution.
It is this article’s thesis that the outcome of the February 2023 presidential election in FCT/Abuja validates the foresight of the Generals who envisioned and implemented the FCT project as a deliberately designed “neutral microcosm” of Nigeria, where ethnicity did not trump all else—a kind of legitimising “litmus test” of the ability of an aspiring candidate for the highest office in the land to appeal to and garner threshold support from diverse segments of the population.
Until such a time that Nigerian political leaders can harness our rich multi-ethnic and cultural heritage into the positive force for change that it is, an emphasis on obtaining at least 25% of the votes in FCT/Abuja as a constitutional requirement may serve as a necessary barometer for both measuring and safeguarding the nation’s true political pulse in ideals of national unity and democracy.
As the only “ethnically neutral zone” of the country, with above average income, voter education and awareness, and security atmosphere relatively free from voter intimidation and vote suppression, it logically follows that the legitimacy of any individual aspiring to lead a diverse and significant country like Nigeria should be questioned, if they fail to garner at least 25% of the electoral votes from this special territory. The voice of people in the FCT must not be taken lightly (i.e., not among the 24 ‘states’ mandated by the constitution), or without factoring in its historical context and raison d’etre. For both the generals and civilians alike, FCT symbolizes true unity, representing a shared national identity about the progressive Nigeria everyone wants.
•Morah received a PhD from the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, in 1990 with a dissertation on the establishment of Nigeria’s FCT.
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